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EXECUTIVE BRIEF
Harnessing the
Youth Bulge By Sarah HarperHow Asia can take advantage of its changing age composition.
As the 20th century was drawing to a close, an overpopulated world fuelled by 
high birth rates seemed to be the top concern for policymakers, economists and 
environmentalists alike. The overwhelming question they were grappling with 
was: How could world population be prevented from growing to over 20 billion 
in the next century? Yet, within a couple of decades, demographic predictions 
have shifted from rampant growth to declining and ageing populations. Revised 
forecasts now expect global population to increase from its current 7 billion to 
around 11 billion by the end of the 21st century. 
These new demographic trends, however, bring new challenges. Presently, in 
many countries, the working-age population (which is variously defined as persons 
aged 15 to 60/64) outnumbers the combined population of older adults and children. 
Globally the working-age population is currently five times more than those over 
60. By 2050, this will almost have halved. Not only will the large working-age cohorts 
start to enter old age, in many countries they will live for much longer, well into 
their 80s and even 90s.
Asia specifically will have a large population of working-age adults until 
2050. At that time, of its 5 billion people, one billion will be over 60 years of age, 
and slightly less than one billion under 15—leaving over half the population of 
working age. Unsurprisingly, the global distribution of people will also change–
Asia will comprise 54 percent of world population by 2050, while Europe will 
account for only around 7 percent.
So before Asia begins to worry about its ageing population, it must fi rst handle 
the more immediate challenges related to its current cohort of young population, or 
the ‘youth bulge’, conventionally defined as a large cohort between the ages of 15 
and 24. Although this youth cohort represents a potential for greater employment, 
income and savings, experience has shown that a large young population doesn’t 
always automatically translate into economic growth. Key institutional frameworks 
related to health, education and governance must accompany it, and the labour markets 
must be well developed and well planned. 
So, what can Asia do to ensure that its youth bulge is converted into a 
demographic dividend?
The demographic transition
The world is undergoing an unprecedented change in its age 
composition. What started in Europe in the mid-18th century 
and took over 200 years to complete began in Asia and Latin 
America during the 20th century and will be completed in less 
than 100 years. It is now beginning in Africa. 
The change follows the general pattern of demographic 
transition—as societies develop economically, mortality falls, 
followed by a lagged fall in fertility rates—leading to a 
significant change in the age structure of the population 
(refer to Figure 1). It has long been recognised that 
population grows rapidly in the time gap between the 
two trends. What is often less understood is the significant 
change in a country’s age composition that occurs as a 
result. Additionally, while economists generally believe 
that demographic transition follows on from economic 
growth, demographers believe that it is a more complex 
process driven by socio-cultural as well as economic factors. 
Indeed, it is argued that demographic transition itself has 
strong implications for the economy, and has played an 
important role in the process of economic development.
In terms of demographic transition and the resultant 
age-structural change, the world can be broadly divided into 
three demographic regimes: advanced economies that are 
moving towards a low percentage of young people and a 
growing percentage of older people; emerging economies 
that are dominated by a large percentage of young and 
mid-life adults sitting between two smaller dependent 
groups–children and the elderly; and the least developed 
economies  with a very large percentage of children, 
adolescents and young people. For example, while Europe, 
typifying a cluster of advanced economies, had more people 
over 60 than under 15 by the turn of the millennium; 
sub-Saharan Africa, part of the least developed economies, 
is projected to still have a third of its population under 15, 
and less than 10 percent over 60 by 2050. 
The macroeconomic effects will differ depending upon 
the age composition of the population. It can be argued 
that large generations attract more societal resources than 
smaller ones. Countries with large young cohorts require 
resources to be diverted to housing, schooling, medical care, 
etc. As this population grows into young adults, a dynamic 
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labour market with the right institutional 
structures can enhance economic growth. 
And as the large cohort begins to age, 
it draws on its own savings and societies’ 
resources for old-age health and 
social care. 
The effects may be mediated by 
market forces. For instance, rapid 
growth in numbers entering the 
labour market may depress wage levels; 
or an increase in the number of older 
people, who are likely to have assets, 
may reduce overall interest rates. Age 
structure can also influence public 
policy. In advanced economies, there 
is currently a need to transfer societal 
resources to the large cohorts of older 
adults, while governments in least 
developed economies often place 
emphasis on the very young. In 
emerging economies, the desire by 
governments to utilise the large cohorts 
of working-age people to drive the 
economy can threaten to reduce 
available resources for dependent 
generations. However, this reallocation 
to ensure intergenerational equity is 
often overshadowed by the huge 
inequalities within each generation–
between those being able to access 
health, education and income, and 
those less able to.
In light of these changing age structures, the challenge in all three demographic 
zones is how to sustain and enhance economic growth and ensure the well-being 
of the population across the extended lifespan, while at the same time reducing 
the inequalities within each generation and ensuring an equitable reallocation of 
resources between generations. 
Youth: resource or peril?
Currently, half the world’s population is under 25, with some 1.2 billion 
aged between 15 and 24. This is the largest cohort ever to transition into adulthood. 
Youth represents a quarter of the global working-age population, but accounts for 
40 percent of total world unemployment. 
In 2012, a member of the U.S. Department of Defence wrote, “From continent 
to continent and across race and religion, the ‘demographic’ of insurgency, ethnic 
confl ict, terrorism and state-sponsored violence holds constant. The vast majority of 
recruits are young men, most of them out of school and out of work. It is a 
formula that hardly varies, whether in the scattered hideouts of Al-Qaeda, on the 
backstreets of Baghdad or Port-au-Prince, or in the rugged mountains of 
Macedonia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or eastern Colombia.”1  The same paper, among 
many others, also cited the ‘youth bulge’, that is, a large population now of 
productive age, as one of the major factors behind the 2012 uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt, referred to as the Arab Spring. 
With two-thirds of its population between 15 and 29, the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region has one of the largest youth groupings in 
the world. High fertility rates mean that many more will join this cohort 
over the next two decades. Although this should imply a huge economic 
opportunity for the region, the youth in this region face a variety of challenges: 
up to 40 percent youth unemployment, lack of education, soaring house 
prices, delayed marriages and youth dependency on families. The growing 
numbers increase competition for limited job and other opportunities. Poor 
access to mortgages, high rental costs and inadequate finances for dowry 
further inhibit men from marrying and setting up an independent home, thus 
excluding them from a stable adult life.
Youth represents 
25 percent of the 
global working-age 
population, but 
accounts for 
40 percent of total 
world unemployment.
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But a large youth bulge need not 
always lead to unemployment, poverty 
and civil unrest. Southeast Asia, which 
had very similar demographics to 
MENA in the 70s and 80s, was able 
to harness its youth bulge and convert 
it into the successful economic growth 
of the Asian Tigers–South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
For instance, between 1975 and 1985, 
Tunisia’s youth bulge coincided with 
that of Hong Kong. While Hong Kong’s 
working population peaked at 70 percent 
in 2005 and 2010, Tunisia’s was at 
67 percent in 2010. Yet we know that 
both countries experienced dramatically 
different outcomes. 
So there must be other things 
going on. 
In Hong Kong, there was a heavy 
focus of public expenditure on health, 
education, social welfare, and public-
private investment in infrastructure, 
with an emphasis on housing and 
transport. Hong Kong also pushed for 
low levels of taxation and subsidised 
public housing. Combined with this 
government intervention to develop a 
social infrastructure, it created a 
fertile ground for entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, the flexible labour 
market allowed for a shift from 
manufacturing of textiles to technology, 
and then to becoming a financial centre. 
All these factors came together to 
contribute to Hong Kong’s success.
Converting youth bulge 
into demographic 
dividend
In Asia today, we are seeing a decline 
in mortality rates and greater life 
expectancy accompanied by a sudden 
decline in childbearing rates of 
women, especially in urban areas. As 
this has come after a period of high 
birth rates, it has resulted in a youth 
bulge. Additionally, the delay of first 
childbirth has enabled women to increase 
the time they spend in education 
as well as in the labour market. Where 
both men and women have joined 
the labour market and have fewer 
children to look after, more of 
societies’ resources get focused on 
economic activity.
While a large number of urban, 
mobile, young people can drive 
productivity and economic growth, 
the right economic structures and 
institutions, and the right policy 
environment, are required for this 
potential to be realised. Thus, a key 
challenge for these societies is to 
enable well-developed, flexible labour 
markets for these young adults. If 
successful, this youth bulge can get 
converted into a demographic dividend. 
The demographic dividend is a 
composite of five distinct drivers of 
change in population age-structure: 
an increase in those of working age; a 
diversion of resources from young 
dependents to investment in physical 
and human capital; an increase in female 
economic activity following a decline in 
childbearing; an accumulation of capital 
by the working population to invest 
in the economy; and incentives to save 
with the realisation of longevity and 
an extended period of late-life, non-
economic activity. 
It is important that public spending 
on education and health should 
continue even as countries develop and 
the economy becomes richer. In some 
emerging countries, such as Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, increased 
taxation from the growing proportion 
of workers will offset the benefits 
needed as the populations age, but 
there is the danger that this might 
impact savings and the level of 
investment required to propel growth.
Additionally,  good economic 
management, with efficient financial 
and labour markets, supported through 
strong governance and institutional 
structures, are essential. There must 
be flexibility in the labour markets to 
allow expansion and polices to 
encourage investment, and a skilled 
working population that is benefiting 
from good quality health and education 
systems. These are required to enable 
the demographic dividend; an increase 
in the working-age population is 
not sufficient by itself to ensure 
economic growth (refer to Figure 2).
The case of Korea
In 1950, just over half the Korean 
population was of working age, with 
42 percent under the age of 15. The 
country prioritised access to family 
planning throughout the 60s and 80s 
by promoting local health centres and 
home visits by care workers. Total 
fertility rate fell from 5.4 in 1950 to 
2.9 in 1975, reaching a low of just 
one child per woman in 2005. 
By 2010, the percentage of 
children had fallen to 15 percent while 
those of working age had risen to 
almost 75 percent. Emphasis was placed 
on expanding healthcare facilities and 
encouraging health insurance. Education 
was also prioritised with 99.2 percent 
of all  children in primary and 
secondary schools. 
By 2030, South Korea’s labour 
pool is expected to shrink by about 
11 percent and the cohort of young 
workers entering employment will fall 
by nearly one-third (refer to Figure 3).
Tiger cubs
What the Asian Tigers achieved in 
the 60s and 70s can be glimpsed in 
other parts of Asia. China capitalised 
on its massive youth cohort. And now 
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there are early signs that the youth 
bulges in the Tiger Cub countries–
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand–will  replicate this 
success. The Philippines is set for a 
considerable increase in its labour 
pool, with a 34 percent increase in 
the next 20 years; and Malaysia and 
Indonesia expect a 20 percent growth 
over the same period.
Thailand is seen as a modern 
Southeast Asian economic powerhouse. 
Like the other Asian Tigers, Thailand 
prioritised health, education and family 
planning as part of its developmental 
goals–the result of which was a 
dramatic shift in age composition. 
By 2010, Thailand’s working age 
population peaked at 71.8 percent, 
and is expected to shrink by about 
12 percent over the next 20 years. 
Many Asian countries will have 
the opportunity to convert their youth 
bulge into a demographic dividend over 
the next few decades. The demographic 
dividend period in China and Thailand 
is forecast to last until 2035 to 2040, 
Malaysia until 2045, and India and 
Indonesia until 2050. Vietnam, also 
poised for a demographic dividend, 
has a working-age population that is 
very similar to Thailand. At the same 
time, these societies will need to ensure 
basic education and health for 
children, women and the elderly, and tackle the growing inequalities between the 
burgeoning urban middle class and the often-neglected rural poor. They must also 
tackle the inequalities within urban areas, including providing the infrastructure for 
sprawling urban growth. All this, while maintaining the much-needed economic 
growth to support raising standards of living for all.
The technology factor
Historically, new technology, such as 19th century manufacturing advances or 
20th century computerisation, led to a substitution of skilled labour through the 
simplification and replication of tasks. However, the modern relationship between 
technological development and employment seems to be different, as advances in 
robotics and digital communications will principally reduce low-skilled and 
low-wage occupations, while highly skilled jobs will stay protected. One estimation 
is that nearly half the jobs in the U.S. may become automatable over the next 20 years, 
with transport, distribution and manufacturing being particularly affected. Over the 
next decade, a 25 percent increase is predicted in the use of robotics for manufacturing.
Asia, in particular, has benefited from the availability of cheap labour and the 
subsequent offshoring of jobs from Europe and the United States. This promoted rural-
urban migration, which in turn drove consumption, enabling the development of 
local markets and a thriving service economy–ultimately helping to convert the youth 
bulge into the demographic dividend. Unsurprisingly, it will be these countries that are 
likely to be most affected by the impact of technological change on employment. 
There is a supply-side issue as well. With the steep rise in labour costs of up to 
17 percent a year, countries like China are already pricing themselves out of the cheap 
labour market. Rather than these jobs moving to other Asian countries like Vietnam 
or Bangladesh, many are returning to advanced economies where they are being 
replaced by robots. In the 1990s, the U.S. textile industry was decimated when 
manufacturing moved to China and India to take advantage of cheap labour. Today, the 
U.S. textile industry is being revitalised with the help of robotics and advanced 
digital machinery, reducing labour requirements in some sectors by over 90 percent. 
It is not only in manufacturing that such developments are seen. Advanced 
voice recognition systems will have the ability to replace human labour in call centres; 
wordsmith programmes are already undertaking copyediting tasks and composing 
news articles for agencies such as Associated Press. Skills in mechatronics–a 
combination of mechanical, electronic and computer skills–can adapt to these 
changes, but this will require a highly educated and skilled workforce. In a similar 
vein, IBM has created the Watson computer, which can scale or break down 
expertise into algorithms so that tasks can be easily learnt by computers and 
widely disseminated. Watson is described as a machine that can develop cognitive 
skills and improve its performance or ‘learn’ with feedback from humans 
and the computer itself.  
With the steep rise in labour costs of up to 
17 percent a year, countries like China are already 
pricing themselves out of the cheap labour market.
When and to what extent the creative and social intelligence 
of humans will be easily and widely replicated by machines is 
still debatable, yet the trends are clear. The intersection of age- 
structural change and the digital revolution has very clear 
implications for emerging and advanced economies. In Asia 
and also in Latin America, the youth bulge and growing labour 
supply are being threatened by automation. The jobs that will 
be available in both advanced and emerging economies 
will increasingly be for highly skilled technicians, requiring 
greater investments in human capital and education. 
Enhancing human capital
It may be argued that the most important policy that any 
government could introduce to ameliorate the negatives 
and promote the positives of age-structural change is to 
enhance the human capital of their population through 
education and training. The role of education in reducing 
childbearing rates by delaying childbirth is evidenced in the 
direct link between education and contraceptive use. The 
desired family size also declines with increasing education in 
most countries.
For emerging economies especially, the demographic 
dividend is made possible with a more highly educated 
population. In particular, high skill levels are required in the 
uptake and adoption of new technologies. And for the advanced 
economies, education can also help to keep open the window of 
opportunity as the percentage of working-age people starts to 
decline. Enhanced human capital across the population 
and throughout individual lifespans through lifetime 
education, training and learning enables a continuation of 
economic productivity.
Maintaining the well-being of an ageing population is 
another means to sustain human capital, especially given the 
demographic patterns. This includes focusing on healthy 
children, a healthy workforce and a healthy cohort of 
elderly. Adequate investments in health are required to ensure, 
not just longer lives, but longer, healthy lives. 
20th century institutions, 21st century 
challenges
Over the next 15 years, globally, some two billion babies will 
be born, another two billion children will need to commence 
school, and 1.2 billion young adults will need to find work. 
“While the demographic transition produces favourable 
conditions, it does not guarantee the supply of workers 
will be gainfully employed. Nor does it ensure that those who 
wish to save will find themselves encouraged to do so.”2 
Increasing unemployment, youth dissent, inequality and the 
inequitable distribution of resources alongside economic growth, 
frame the major challenges facing the emerging economies of 
Asia today: 20th century institutions will not suffice to solve 
21st century problems. Education, health and the ability of 
people to move in the light of population needs and pressures 
are important to adapt to age-structural change. And yet all 
three face constraints inherited from the previous century.
While the flow of people, resources and communications 
are increasingly cross-border, legal and political action is 
controlled in the main within national boundaries. There will be 
a quarter of a billion international migrants by 2030, yet there 
is very little international flow of health, education or welfare 
that transcends national boundaries, but which is essential for 
the well-being of the migrants and for ensuring the best 
outcomes for them and their host populations. 
Education is still instituted in old systems, which emphasise 
foundation schooling to the neglect of advanced and lifetime 
learning and training. Similarly, health systems are still 
predominantly focused on tackling acute diseases in a world 
where chronic conditions and comorbidities will be the largest 
health challenge.
These policy-level changes will become even more critical 
as Asia’s population ages and the workforce concomitantly 
shrinks in size, increasing the grey burden on healthcare and 
the need to update and upgrade skills through education and 
training. Acknowledging the importance of age-structural 
change and integrating it into national and international 
policymaking will therefore be a critical piece of the solution, 
today and in the future. 
Sarah Harper 
is Professor of Gerontology at the University of Oxford and Director  
of the Oxford Institute of Population Aging 
This article is based upon her presentation at the 2016 Shaw 
Foundation Distinguished Faculty Lecture Series held at Singapore 
Management University. 
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